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In the Supreme Court
o f the State o f Utah
JERALD WIXOM GREAVES, \
Plaintiff-Respondent, 1
vs.

> Case No. 13631

STATE OF UTAH,
1
Defendant-Appellant. I
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
This case was brought upon an action for
declatory judgement pursuant to Utah Code Annotated §78-33-1, 2 (1953), and filed against the State
of Utah as Defendant alleging that Utah Code Annotated §41-6-44.2 (Supp. 1973) and Utah Code Annotated §41-2-18 (Supp. 1973) as it pertains to Utah
Code Annotated §41-6-44.2 are unconstitutional.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
In the District Court of the First Judicial District
in and for the County of Cache, State of Utah, on
February 26, 1974, Judge VeNoy Christoffersen
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declared Utah Code Annotated, §41-6-44.2 (Supp.
1973) unconstitutional.
No ruling was issued regarding the constitutionality of Utah Code Annotated §41-2-17 (Supp.
1973).
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent seeks affirmance of the ruling of the
Lower Court.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The Respondent adopts the
statement of the facts in its entirity.

Appellant's

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE LOWER COURT DID NOT
SPECIFICALLY GROUND ITS DECISION
UPON A LACK OF MEATS REA OR
CRIMINAL INTENT.
The clerks and attorneys for the Appellant have
done an admirable job in research of the law, both case
and statutory, and of secondary authority in defending
and supporting Points I and II of their Argument.
Despite Appellant's over emphasis of phrases such as
"public welfare offenses," and the rationalization that
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such obviates and over rides the basic requirement of
criminal element of intent, since any crime from
murder to parking meter violations could reasonably
be construed as public welfare offenses, the Lower
Court simply did not specifically base its decision upon
the statute's lack of mens rea element.
For the Appellant to speculate as to the most
"likely" interpretation of the Lower Court's decision
and then argue their supposition is simply adding
support to speculation and scatter-gunning in hopes of
covering all possible targets.
There is no question that times have changed,
industrialization and automated mobility have
spawned "undreamed of changes in the law, including
criminal law. One such change is in the area of "public
welfare offenses." The Appellant would have the
Court believe that such will result in greater good for
a greater number. This utilitarian approach could, if
taken to its logical end result in complete deprivation
of any rights and dignity held by the individual,
whether enumerated in the Constitution or not.
It is the position of the Respondent that the
Lower Court did not specifically ground its decision
upon the lack of mens rea or criminal intent in the
statute in question, and will not respond to Appellants
argument there of directly except to point out that the
law as to whether criminal offenses require mens rea
or the element of criminal intent is neither settled nor
static and that the United State Supreme Court has
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been inconsistent in its declarations concerning the
same. See Shelvin-Carpenter Co. vs. Minnesota, 218
U.S. 57 (1910); United States vs. Balint 258 U.S.
250 (1922); United States vs. Dotterweich 320 U.S.
277 (1943); Morisette vs. United States 342 U.S.
246 (1952); Lambort vs. California 355 U.S. 225 (1957);
Smith vs. California 361 U.S. 147 (1959); Robinson vs.
California 370 U.S. 660 (1962); Powell vs. Texas 289
U.S. 514 (1968); Papachistor vs. City of Jacksonville
92 S. Ct. 839 (1972).
Although the lack of intent was not the anchor of
the Lower Courts decision, and the law is anything but
settled in the area, if Appellant's Point II is correct,
then its argument in Point I is moot.
The Appellant's argument in Point II appears
essentially to state that Utah Code Annotated §41-644.2 (Supp. 1973) is not a strict liability crime by
definition, and therefore falls into a category of offenses, the mens rea of which are supplied by Utah
Code Annotated §76-2-101 et. seq.
Appellant concludes his argument in Point II
with the statement that "Thus, the Lower Court
judge's declaration that the statute is unconstitutional
for lack of an intent element is untenable." That
conclusion is untenable simply because the Lower
Court did not specifically declare the statute unconstitutional for lack of an intent element. The
Appellant admittedly only conjectures that such was
the Lower Court's basis for its decision.

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

5
POINT II
Point III of Appellant's argument is not unlike
its Points I and II in not being based upon the Lower
Court's decision. The Lower Court discussed in the
opinion that the statute must provide a relationship
between the persons blood alcohol content of .10
percent and some act of the person charged.
The Appellant supposes, again not unlike its
suppositions of its first two points, that the Lower
Court is discussing actus reas and then points out that
the actus reas is the state of being in physical control
of a vehicle. The Lower Court's decision speaks for
itself in stating that the relationship it requires is one
concerning the taking or consumption of intoxicating
liquor and the alcohol content of the person's blood.
Again, as in the Appellant's Points I and II,
Appellant erroneously concludes that the Lower Court
pivoted its decision of something other than what was
stated by the Court.
POINT III
SECTION 41-6-44.2, SUPRA IS VOID AND
UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
Although on its face, as the Appellant aptly points
out, section 41-6-44.2 supra is not vague and is worded
in clear, unambiguous language but when enforced
through Utah Code Annotated, 41-2-18-(a)(3)(1953) it
works to deny the person charged the right to operate

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

6

a motor vehicle without regard as to his ability to
operate the vehicle.
Therein lies that statute's vagueness in not
specifying the basis upon which the denial is made.
Once the person charged obtains a right to drive
through acquiring a driver's license; the procedure by
which it may be revoked or suspended requires a fair
hearing. Bell vs. Burton 40 L U.S. 535 (1971) and
unless that hearing is regarding his ability to operate a
motor vehicle, it does not afford him due process as to
that right.
The only thing a hearing on Section 41-6-44.2
(1953) determines is whether in fact the person's
blood-alcohol reading was over the .10 percent level.
The Supreme Court in Vlandis vs. Kline 37 L. ed. 2nd;
6341 Law Week 4796 (1973) and cases cited therein
stated that absolute presumptions are highly
disfavored. The reason is obvious, because they deny
the person charged any defense, whether valid or not.
The statute in question further violates the
Respondent's right to due process by establishing a
standard which is impossible for Respondent to
ascertain in advance and makes a violation thereof a
crime with serious, criminal or economic sanctions.
The argument that difficulty in proving drunk
driving cases justifies this type of statute points out
the problem that the Respondent also does not know
when the violation has occurred until after the tests
have been given (see Bell, supra, a policy of law vs.
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substance of due process). All blood-alcohol tests given
in our area are sophisticated and require skilled and
trained administrators. It is not like a speedometer
which is readily visible. This, coupled witfi ^the
problem that alcohol effects different people in different ways under different circumstances, means a
person may be at a statutory level without any
knowledge or warning thereof and in fact, still be
perfectly confident to operate a vehicle. Further
problems come from the fact that alcohol content of
each drinker is not the same; levels and quantities to
reach a blood-alcohol level with each person differs,
and permissible blood-alcohol level vary in each state.
The statute in question denies the Respondent
herein equal protection under the law in that it establishes an arbitrary class in criminal conduct, the inclusion therewith denies the Respondent a basic right
to travel. Our courts have sustained classifications
when reasonable. The Supreme Court has made
justification more stringent where the inclusions
within the class denies a basic right. The Supreme
Court has held the right to travel is such a basic right
and therefore the burden becomes extremely heavy on
the state that shows justification for denial. It is
submitted that an absolute and automatic inclusion of
everyone into a class as criminals and whose driving
privileges are revoked for one year because of bloodalcohol content as .10 percent is not only arbitrary
inclusion, but violates the basic right of travel in that
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conviction deprives the member of the class to operate
the motor vehicle for one year, not for just 30 or 90
days as in many states. A revocation of Respondent's
drivers license upon the arbitrary, unconstitutional
law as this deprives him his right to travel outside the
State of Utah, although he may have obtained a
conditional license in order to travel to and from work,
such a license is not recognized in sister states of Idaho
and Wyoming.
Respondent is aware that the statues involved are
intended to protect the public from consequences of
drunken automobile drivers on public highways. Such
protection can and must be provided without
deprevation of constitutional rights. Appellant seems
preoccupied by the fact that personal hardship has no
bearing upon the issue as to a persons right to drive an
automobile. Such may be the case, but it is not
Respondent's contention that personal hardship is the
reason for unconstitutionality of the above cited
statutes. The above cited statutes are unconstitutional
because they deny the Respondent his constitutional
right to equal protection, due process of a law and his
right to travel without a due process hearing thereon.
POINT IV
THE LEGISLATURE HAS THE POWER TO
REGULATE AND PUNISH CRIMINAL
CONDUCT.
Respondent has no argument that the Legislature
has the power to regulate use of the highways and
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make unlawful the act of operating a motor vehicle by
a person under the influence of intoxicating liquor.
Nor does Respondent contend that intoxicated
drivers are a danger to the public and that the
Legislature passed Section 41-6-44.2 supra in an
attempt to reduce alcohol related highway accidents.
It is not contended here that a blood-alcohol test is
not an accurate method of determining alcohol content
in the blood.
The Appellant goes to great lengths in Point V of
its argument to point out that .10 percent bloodalcohol content can be dangerously intoxicating, and
even that Europeans feel that the United States is
"ludicrously liberal" in its standards.
With the information and arguments for the .10
percent standard and against intoxicated drivers, the
Respondent takes no exception. But the issue is
whether the statute passed by the Legislature, admittedly based upon reason is constitutional.
It is the Respondent's position that had the
statute included the basis upon which the Legislature
passed it as used in connection with Section 41-2-18 (a)
(3) (1953) supra, or provided the Respondent with the
opportunity of a hearing as to his ability to drive
before his license is automatically revoked, the statute
could stand. Without the above, all the rationalizations
and supporting evidence the Legislature may have
considered cannot justify the denial of Respondent his
constitutional rights without a due process hearing.
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POINT V
THE LOWER COURT DID NOT VIOLATE
THE
UTAH
RULES
OF
CIVIL
PROCEDURE NOR DID THE LOWER
COURT ABUSE HIS DESCRETION.
The Apellant contends in Point VI of its
argument that the Lo^er Court violated the rules of
Civil Procedure by operating what appears to be,
though not specifically designated as, a summary
judgement for the Respondent.
It is admitted by the Respondent that the Lower
Court's procedure in this case is out of the ordinary
and perhaps not what was expected.
However, Appellant admits that its Rule 12 (b) (6)
motion to dismiss could have been construed by the
Lower Court under the rules (Rule 56, Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure) as a motion for summary judgment.
Had the Lower Court granted Appellant's motion as a
motion for summary judgment based upon its motion
and accompanying memorandum to dismiss, Appellant
would have thought that fair, even though Respondent
would have responded to the motion only as one to
dismiss and not as one for summary judgment. The
Lower Court's action is not out of the purview of the
authority under rule 12 (b) (6) supra since the position
of the parties were expressed through their motion
and memoranda. It would have been only a formality
for the Respondent to have labeled its response to
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Appellant's motion a motion for summary judgment.
Since Respondent was required to respond
sufficiently to defend, had Appellant's motion been
considered by the Lower Court as a motion for summary judgment, it puts no hardship upon the Appellant to prepare its motion and argument with that
possibility also in mind.
Appellant contends that the Lower Court denied
the Appellant the opportunity of fully presenting its
case and therefore violated Rule 8, Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure in that the pleadings were not construed to
do substantial justice.
Respondent submits that the Appellant could
have presented its argument more fully in its motion
to dismiss had it wished to do so, and that the Appellant itself, and not the Lower Court must accept the
responsibility for not having done so. Furthermore,
had Appellant's motion been granted as a summary
judgement, it is doubtful it would be argued that
substantial justice was not done under Rule 8 supra.
Appellant argues that Rule 13 (A) of the First
District Court unfairly denies the Appellant a full
hearing on the matter.
The obvious problem with that argument is that
the Appellant was not harmed thereby because it
never requested an oral hearing and was therefore
never denied one. Appellant admits that it did not
read the Lower Court's local rules and now submits
that even had it read them, it would have had to read
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more than the heading only. Certainly reading the
local rules cannot be too onerous a task for an office
having the facilities and personnel of the Appellant.
The Appellant has no standing to argue the
fairness or unfairness of the Lower Court's rules since
it did not bother to read them, nor was it denied a
hearing because of them as a hearing was never
requested by the Appellant.
CONCLUSION
The Lower Court's finding that Section 41-644.2 supra is unconstitutional should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
GORDON J. LOW
Attorney for Respondent
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